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Abstract 
Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we 
analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and 
publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders (managers/directors, 
institutional investors, non-financial companies, individuals/families, and banks), a 
breakdown specific to our dataset. Controlling for various factors, we find that 
ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but that such findings 
mainly hold for privately owned banks. On the whole, a higher equity stake of either 
individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk 
and default risk. Also, institutional investors and non-financial companies seem to 
impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. We further find no 
significant differences in asset risk and default risk between publicly-held and 
privately-owned banks. Moreover, for public banks, changes in ownership structure 
do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of 
public banks and the ownership structure is no more a determinant to explain risk 
differences. An exception is that higher stakes of banking institutions in public banks 
are associated with lower credit and default risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The last three decades have been characterized by repeated banking crises (the 
financial crisis of 2008, the US savings and loans debacle of the eighties, the 1994-95 
Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian financial crises…). Such episodes 
highlight the inherently unstable nature of banking and the tendency that banks have 
towards excessive risk taking. In this paper, we aim to focus on one of the driving 
forces behind the risk-taking incentives of banks, namely shareholders’ behavior and 
their incentives to take higher risk. The issue of ownership structure is of particular 
interest for the banking industry as several factors interact and alter governance, such 
as the quality of bank regulation and supervision and the opacity of bank assets. 
Moreover, banking systems faced major changes during the last 20 years. With 
financial deregulation and market integration, the scope of activities of banks has 
been completely reshaped ranging from traditional intermediation products to an array 
of new businesses. These trends led to substantial consolidation in the banking 
industry and consequently to significant changes in ownership and capital structure. 
Also, institutional ownership of common stock has increased substantially over the 
past twenty years. This might also imply changes in corporate governance and in 
banks’ behavior in terms of risk taking.  
However, it is also well known that because of greater separation of ownership 
and control, firms with publicly held equity face different agency problems than 
privately held firms. Furthermore, for publicly traded banks, risk-taking incentives 
can be influenced by market forces. On the one hand, the market is expected to 
monitor or to influence the risk behavior of banks and therefore the impact of 
ownership changes on risk cannot be assessed without considering incentives driven 
by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 
2001). In the new Basel Capital Accord, market discipline is one of the three pillars, 
along with capital regulation (first pillar) and banking supervision (second pillar). The 
idea is to rely on market forces to enhance banking supervision or to mitigate 
shareholders’ risk taking incentives and consequently market discipline is expected to 
play an important role for publicly held banks and to some extent for private banks 
that are strongly reliant on market debt. On the other hand, banks that are prone to 
become public might have different objectives in terms of growth and risk-return 
strategies. Public equity is more liquid than private equity and can thus be raised at 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460703
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lower cost. Hence, if publicly owned banks’ purpose to access capital markets is to 
finance faster growth opportunities, they are more likely to take on more risk than 
privately owned banks.  
 To our knowledge there has been no research on whether risk might be 
different for privately-owned banks and publicly-held banks under specific ownership 
profiles. Kwan (2004), working on a sample of US bank holding companies (BHC), 
finds that loan quality and earnings variability are not different between traded BHCs 
and privately held BHCs. One of our aims in this paper is to assess the risk-taking 
behavior of banks by combining the two interrelated dimensions of ownership 
structure and market discipline.    
It has been stressed in the theoretical and empirical literature that agency 
problems and risk-taking behavior are different according to the nature of the 
shareholder. A first issue is the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Theory indicates that 
shareholders with a diversified portfolio are motivated to take more risk for a higher 
expected return whereas managers take less risk to protect their position and personal 
benefits, and preserve their acquired human capital (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Esty, 1998). Empirically, Saunders et 
al (1990) are the first to test the relationship between banks’ ownership structure and 
their risk-taking incentives. They find a positive relationship between managerial 
stock ownership (proportion of stock held by managers) and risk taking. Moreover, 
they find that banks controlled by shareholders take more risk than banks controlled 
by managers. A number of studies, following Saunders et al. (1990), find a significant 
effect of ownership concentration on risk-taking but without any consensus on the 
sign of such a relationship. If some studies find a negative relationship, others obtain 
U-shaped relationships (or inverse U-shaped) between ownership concentration and 
risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Chen, et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000). U-
shaped relationships between ownership and risk taking could be explained by 
managers’ entrenchment. Moreover, Sullivan and Spong (2007) show that stock 
ownership by hired managers is positively linked with bank risk, meaning that under 
certain conditions hired managers operate their bank more closely in line with 
stockholder interests.  
Another issue well developed in the literature is the comparison of the 
performance (profitability and asset quality) of state-owned banks compared to their 
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private counterparts. Agency costs within government bureaucracy can result in weak 
managerial incentives and misallocation of resources. According to the agency cost 
view, managers exert less effort than their private counterparts or divert resources for 
personal benefits, such as, for example, career concerns. For the political view of state 
ownership, government-owned banks are inefficient because of the politicians’ 
deliberate policy of transferring resources to their supporters (Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). It has been underlined that state-owned banks have poorer loan 
quality and higher default risk than private-owned banks (Berger et al., 2005; Iannotta 
et al., 2007). Iannota et al, 2007 also highlight that mutual banks and government-
owned banks appear as less profitable than private-owned banks. Moreover, they find 
that government-owned banks have poorer loan quality and higher default risk, while 
mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private-owned 
and government-owned banks. In addition, some papers have shown that foreign-
owned banks exhibit a higher performance than other banks, particularly in 
developing countries (Claessens et al., 2001; Bonin et al, 2005; Micco et al., 2007).  
Beside the issues of the manager owner conflict and the differences between 
state-owned and private-owned firms, there are other aspects that are well developed 
in the literature on non-financial firms but not in the literature on financial firms. 
First, institutional investors (investment companies, investment advisors, pension 
funds…) who exercise significant voting power can shape the nature of corporate risk 
taking. In terms of shareholding size, expertise in processing information and 
monitoring managers, such investors are very different from atomistic individual 
investors. Institutional investors can exert greater control for reasons of economies of 
scale in corporate supervision. Pound (1988) highlights that institutional investors can 
exercise a control at a lower cost as they have more experience. There is also the 
possibility, however, that managers and institutional investors form an alliance, so 
that insider interests could take priority over the maximization of firm value. At the 
same time, as institutional investors have a diversified portfolio of investments, they 
may have lower incentives to exercise control. Empirical evidence (Acker and 
Athanassakos, 2003), based on non-financial firms, does not provide conclusive 
results on the effect of control by institutional investors on firm value. Second, 
family-owned firms are perceived as less willing to take risk but also as less 
profitable. More generally, firms with large, undiversified owners such as founding 
families may forgo maximum profits because their wealth is not sufficiently 
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diversified. Families also limit executive management positions to family members, 
suggesting a restricted labor pool from which to obtain qualified and capable talent, 
potentially leading to competitive disadvantages relatively to non-family-owned firms 
(Morck et al, 2000). However, James (1999) posits that families have longer 
investment horizons leading to greater investment efficiency. Stein (1988, 1989) 
shows that the presence of shareholders with relatively long investment horizons can 
mitigate the incentives for myopic investment decisions by managers. Regarding the 
banking industry, few papers analyze this issue. Laeven (1999) considers different 
forms of bank ownership including state-owned, foreign-owned, company-owned and 
family-owned banks but not banks owned by institutional investors. Working on a 
panel of Asian banks before the Asian crisis of 1997, he finds that family-owned 
banks were among the most risky banks together with company-owned banks whereas 
foreign-owned banks took little risk relatively to other banks. 
 
 The objective of this paper is to extend the current literature which analyzes 
how ownership structure affects bank risk taking and profitability in several 
directions. First, we work on a broader classification of shareholders by considering 
the equity held by managers, individuals/families, non-financial companies, but also 
the equity held by institutional investors and by banks. Second, we consider the 
proportion of equity held by each category of owner instead of using dummy 
variables to divide ownership into mutually exclusive categories as in most of the 
previous studies on bank ownership (Berger et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2005; Boubakri 
et al., 2005; Williams and Nguyen, 2005). We are therefore able to measure the level 
of ownership dispersion/concentration within each of the five categories of 
shareholders we consider. We can hence check if the level of ownership dispersion 
matters when assessing the relationship between ownership structure and bank 
risk/profitability. Working with continuous variables instead of binary variables also 
enables us to analyze how the interaction of equity held by different types of 
shareholders influences the risk-taking behavior of banks. It allows us to study the 
link between ownership structure and risk more thoroughly by dealing with the issue 
of possible coalitions among different categories or groups. Nevertheless, for 
consistency with previous studies we also study the link between risk and the nature 
of the main shareholder. Third, by investigating the link between ownership structure 
and risk for both listed (publicly held) and non-listed (privately owned) banks we 
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question the ability of market forces to influence bank risk-taking behavior (market 
discipline) under different ownership arrangements. Fourth, previous studies that use 
a detailed breakdown of the stakes held by different categories of owners were mostly 
dedicated to US banks and could not consider as many categories of shareholders 
because ownership of banks by non-financial companies is not permitted. By working 
on European banks we are therefore able to introduce an additional category, non-
financial firms, which the literature considers as playing a very controversial role in 
influencing the management of financial institutions. Studies on European banks have 
focused on the nature of ownership (public, private, mutual, cooperative…) rather 
than on the structure of ownership in private banks. In this paper we consider only 
one category of banks. We focus on commercial banks because they are assumed to 
have homogeneous objective functions, and to our knowledge this is the first study 
that looks into the relationship between ownership structure and risk for European 
commercial banks.  
We work on a panel of European banks through the period 1999-2005. Our 
results show that different ownership structures imply different levels of risk and 
profitability, but such findings mainly hold for privately owned banks. Publicly-held 
banks with different ownership structures do not present different levels of risk and 
profitability, suggesting that market forces might be aligning the risk behavior of such 
banks.    
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our 
data and variables. Section 3 presents the methodology and the hypotheses tested. The 
empirical results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 reports robustness checks and 
discusses further issues. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data, variables and descriptive statistics  
2.1 Data collection and sample definition   
 The annual data used in this paper are taken from Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
which provides information on financial statements and ownership structure for 
financial institutions worldwide. We collect the percentage of stocks held by 
shareholders by considering the following items: managers/directors, institutional 
investors, non-financial companies, self ownership, individual/family investors, 
banks, foundations/research institutes, government, unnamed private shareholders and 
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other unnamed shareholders. Bankscope Fitch IBCA also provides for listed banks 
data on the percentage of stocks held by the public. We use a sample consisting of an 
unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1999 to 2005 for a set of European 
commercial banks established in 16 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United-Kingdom
2
. As argued 
above, we do not consider other types of banks (cooperative, mutual…) to ensure that 
all the banks in our sample follow the same profit maximization objective 
(homogeneous objective function). We identify in Bankscope 1586 commercial banks 
for which income statements and balance sheets are provided for the period 1999-
2005
3
. We delete all the banks with less than five consecutive years of time series 
observations
4
, which leaves us with 688 banks. Out of this number of banks, we 
isolate 320 banks for which detailed data on direct ownership are available for the 
years 2001, 2003 and 2005 in the annual financial statement
5
. Eventually, we apply 
other selection criteria and end up with a smaller sample of banks.  First, we only 
consider banks with a stable ownership structure by comparing the proportion of 
equity held by the main shareholders over the period 1999-2005. This restriction is 
important to accurately analyze the impact of ownership structure on the performance 
and risk of banks. Since our aim is to focus on the influence of different categories of 
shareholders on management, we need to exclude short run ownership and hit and run 
strategies that will not shape the behavior of management and therefore bank 
risk/profitability in a given direction. We hence only keep banks for which the 
ownership shares of the main category of shareholders fluctuate by less than 10% 
over the considered period. 249 banks are consistent with this criterion which enables 
us to work on a firm-level homogeneous sample. The final sample consists of 249 
                                                 
2 Norway is excluded from our analysis because no banks provide data consistent with the criteria we 
use to build and clean our database. 
3 All the banks in our sample publish their annual financial statements at the end of the calendar year. 
We consider local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for all our sample period.  
4 This condition enables us to accurately compute the standard deviations of some variables to define 
risk indicators.  
5 Each annual financial statement provides information on the ownership structure of banks for the 
current year and the previous two years. The report of the year 2001 therefore gives information on the 
ownership structure of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In our study, we consider the direct owner that 
can be different from the ultimate owner (for example 20% of a bank’s stocks can be owned by a firm 
(direct owner) in which a family might have a stake of 10%...). We use direct ownership in order to 
consider the different categories that directly exert control. We do not consider the ultimate owners 
because Bankscope only provides information on such owners since 2004 and only for shareholders 
with stakes higher than 25%.   
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European commercial banks within which 80 are listed publicly traded banks
6
 (see 
Table 1 for further details on the distribution of banks by country). Among these 
banks, 191 banks have a major shareholder with a stake above 50% throughout the 
whole sample period and 58 banks (out of which 44 are listed) exhibit ownership 
shares by the main shareholder fluctuating by less than 10%. We also consider a 
subsample that satisfies the criteria that the sum of the different shares that are 
displayed in Bankscope is at least equal to 99%
7
. This criterion leaves us with 198 
banks, within which 29 are listed. We test the robustness of our results by running our 
estimations on both the large sample of 249 banks and on the restricted sample of 198 
banks. We also conduct estimations on the sample of 191 banks for which we have a 
major shareholder with a stake above 50% to be consistent with previous studies.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for both our sample of 249 banks 
and the largest sample of 1586 commercial banks available under Bankscope Fitch 
IBCA for our period of analysis. We use data from consolidated accounts if available 
and from unconsolidated accounts otherwise.  
                         Insert Table 2 here 
 
2.2 Risk variables  
We consider different measures of asset risk and default risk commonly used 
in the literature. We compute three standard measures of risk for each bank 
throughout the period under study based on annual accounting data: the standard 
deviation of the return on average assets (SDROA), the standard deviation of the 
return on average equity (SDROE)
8
, and the mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions 
to net loans (M_LLP). We also compute default risk measures. First we use the “Z-
score” proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986) which indicates the probability of 
                                                 
6 Our full dataset contains 137 listed banks. We need to delete: (i) 7 banks with less than five years of 
time series observations; (ii) 31 banks for which ownership is not detailed in the three reports provided 
for the years 2001, 2003 and 2005; (iii) 19 banks that exhibit a change in ownership structure between 
1999 and 2005.   
7 The data on ownership structure provided by Bankscope (% share of each type of owner) do not 
always add up to 100%, particularly for listed banks because we do not always have the percentage 
held by the public.  
8 We define average equity and average assets at time t as: (amount outstanding at time t + amount 
outstanding at time t-1)/2.  
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failure of a given bank (Z)
9
. Higher values of Z-scores imply lower probabilities of 
failure. Second, we use the ZP Score (ZP) as in Goyeau and Tarazi (1992) and Lepetit 
et al. (2008) and its two additive components
10
 (ZP1 and ZP2). ZP1 is a measure of 
bank portfolio risk whereas ZP2 is a measure of leverage risk.  
Table 2 provides statistics for some of our measures of asset risk and default 
risk, on average for the whole sample of banks, and for the panel of non-listed and 
listed banks. Mean tests show that we do not have significant differences in risk 
between our two samples of publicly-owned and privately-owned banks. These results 
are consistent with Kwan (2004) who works on a panel of US banks. However, unlike 
his findings our sample of European public banks exhibits, on average, a higher 
profitability than our sample of European private banks. A higher profitability for 
listed banks could be explained by the fact that such banks can raise additional equity 
capital at lower transaction costs, which enables them to generate faster growth in 
equity and assets and ultimately to become larger. These banks might benefit from 
economies of scale and generate higher profit per unit of risk than private banks.  
 
2.3 Ownership variables 
In our study, we code the ownership structure based on the stockholder 
information contained in the BankScope database. As our aim is to analyze how the 
interaction of equity held by different types of shareholders influences the risk-taking 
behavior of banks, we have to consider as many categories of owners as we can. 
However, we only keep the categories of owners for which we are able to identify 
their nature, behavior and incentives to take risk. We therefore exclude three 
categories of owners provided by BankScope: public, unnamed private shareholders 
and other unnamed shareholders. We also require each category of owner to hold 
equity in at least five banks. These criteria lead us to exclude three categories of 
owners, which are self owned, foundation and government
11
.  
Consequently, we end up with five categories of owners that are considered in 
our study: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial companies 
(COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
                                                 
9 )Z (100 average ROE / SDROE= + , where ROE and SDROE are expressed in percentage.  
10 ZP=ZP1 + ZP2 = 
average ROA average(Totalequities / Totalassets)
SDROA SDROA
+ . 
11 Few European banks have equity held by governments, and those that do are mostly German 
cooperative banks which we do not consider in our sample. 
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institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & 
pension funds - (INSTITUT). We create five variables which report for each bank in 
our sample the proportion of equity held by each category of owner. This approach 
allows us to measure the dispersion of ownership and also to analyze the influence of 
different combinations of shareholders on bank risk and profitability. It also enables 
us to account for possible coalitions among different categories of shareholders.  
 
Table A1 in the appendix gives, per country, the distribution of banks for 
which the ownership variables are different from zero as well as the average 
percentage of stock held by the different categories of owners. Tables 3, 4 and 5 
provide some statistics about the ownership structure of our 249 sample banks. Table 
3 shows that the major category of shareholders, in our sample of 249 European 
commercial banks, are other banking institutions with an average of 81.52% of equity. 
Banks that hold equity in another bank exhibit on average higher stakes in non-listed 
banks than in listed banks. Non-financial companies and institutional investors are 
also strongly involved in our sample banks as they hold equity in respectively 78 and 
55 banks out of the 249 banks of our sample. Non-financial companies hold on 
average a higher percentage of equity (39.48%) than institutional investors (35.40%). 
A closer look shows that non-financial companies and institutional investors are more 
often involved in listed banks but they hold a higher proportion of total equity in non-
listed banks. Individuals/families are involved in a relatively few number of listed and 
non-listed banks (25 banks) ; they are more often involved in listed banks but they 
hold a higher proportion of equity in privately-owned banks (50.39%) than in 
publicly-held banks (5.87%). The category managers/directors holds equity in only 8 
banks out of which 7 are listed banks and the average proportion of stocks they hold is 
very low (9.51%) compared to the other types of owners.  
Table 4 displays the distribution of our sample of non-listed and listed banks 
according to the percentage of equity held by each category of shareholder. The 
proportion of equity of each category of owner (except managers/directors) are well 
distributed in the interval ]0-100]. In Table 5, we also present the mean of each risk 
and default indicator for each of our five categories of owners according to the 
proportion of equity they hold. Table 5 shows strong heterogeneity among different 
types of shareholders, allowing us to analyze the behavior of banks depending on their 
ownership structure.  
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We also compare asset risk, default risk, profitability and asset growth of 
public and private banks when held by the same main category of shareholders
12
 (see 
Figure 1). While Figure 1 shows differences in asset risk and profitability between 
listed and non-listed banks for a given shareholder type, these differences are not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, however, we find that public banks exhibit 
higher average asset growth rate than private banks, regardless of the category of the 
main shareholder. These results suggest that, as discussed above, public banks might 
actually choose to raise equity more easily and at lower cost to generate faster growth. 
        Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 and Figure 1 here 
 
 We further measure the ownership dispersion/concentration of our sample of 
European commercials banks in order to analyze its possible impact on the risk-taking 
behavior of banks. The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance are 
theoretically complex and empirically ambiguous. Several approaches have been 
proposed to explain the ambiguity of the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) show that a concentrated ownership might improve the performance of 
firms by increasing monitoring and alleviating the free-rider problem in takeovers. 
But other theoretical works show that large shareholders might exercise control rights 
in order to create private benefits and sometimes to expropriate smaller investors 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Another potential cost of concentration may result if 
managerial initiative is repressed by excessive monitoring (Burkart et al., 1997).  
 Our data provide the proportions of total equity held by different categories of 
owners but not the stakes held by each investor at the individual level. We therefore 
need to check if the level of ownership dispersion within each of the five categories of 
shareholders we consider matters or not when assessing the relationship between 
ownership structure and bank risk/profitability. For this purpose we measure 
ownership dispersion/concentration by computing a Herfindahl index for each of our 
five categories of shareholders
13
 (HERF_MANAGER, HERF_FAMILY, 
                                                 
12 The main category of shareholders is defined as the one with the highest level of equity holding.  
13 For example, for the category INSTITUT, we compute for each bank i the variable OSj defined by the 
ratio of the percentage of equity held by each institutional investor j to the total percentage of equity 
held by all the institutional investors. We then compute our Herfindahl index as 
n
2
j=1
jOS∑  (j represents 
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HERF_INSTITUT, HERF_COMPANY and HERF_BANK). Table 6 highlights that, on 
average, ownership is relatively well concentrated for all the categories of 
shareholders. This is consistent with the studies of La Porta et al. (1999) and Becht 
and Roell (1999) who highlight that ownership structure of firms across the world 
present a relatively high degree of ownership concentration. Tables 6 and 7 show that 
the category MANAGER presents the highest level of ownership concentration with a 
Herfindahl index of 0.948 and on average 1.12 shareholders per bank. The category 
BANK also exhibits a relatively high level of ownership concentration followed by 
FAMILY and INSTITUT. The category with the highest number of shareholders per 
bank is COMPANY, with an average of 4.25 shareholders and a maximum of 66 
shareholders involved in the same bank.  
 Table 8 shows no significant differences in terms of risk and profitability 
between banks with a relatively high level of concentration for the categories of 
FAMILY, INSTITUT and COMPANY and those with a relatively low level of 
ownership concentration in these categories. At first sight, there seems to be no 
impact of ownership concentration/dispersion on the risk-taking behavior of banks. 
When banks hold equity in other banks and their stakes are very concentrated, we find 
that asset risk and profitability are significantly higher compared to banks with a more 
dispersed bank ownership. 
               Insert Tables 6, 7 and 8 here 
 
Finally, we compare our sample of commercial banks with the larger 
population of European commercial banks contained in Bankscope by looking at 
possible differences between the importance of each category of owner in our sample 
of 249 banks and those of the largest sample of 905 banks for which Bankscope Fitch 
IBCA provides information on the ownership structure in 2005. The frequencies of 
banks for which each category of owner holds a positive percentage of equity in our 
sample (see Table 3) are not significantly different from those of the largest sample of 
905 banks (see Table A2 in appendix)
14
. However, the average percentage of equity 
                                                                                                                                            
the category of shareholders INSTITUT and n the total number of institutional investors that hold equity 
in the bank i). For example if we have for bank i two institutional investors holding 10% of total equity 
and 45% of total equity, our Herfindahl index will take the value of 0.70, indicating a relatively high 
level of concentration for the category INSTITUT.  
14 The mean tests performed are available from the authors on request. 
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held by the five categories of owners that we consider is higher in our sample of 249 
banks than in the larger sample of 905 banks. This difference could be explained by 
our choice to restrict our analysis to banks with a stable ownership structure 
throughout our sample period. Investors who hold a stable stake in financial firms 
might be more strongly involved in equity than investors with more diversified 
portfolios and/or shorter investment horizons. 
 
3. Method and hypotheses tested  
 Our objective is first to analyze if commercial banks with different ownership 
structures present significant differences in risk and profitability. Second, we also 
investigate whether market discipline can influence the relationship between 
ownership structure and risk. We therefore test two hypotheses by considering two 
specifications.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Different ownership structures imply different levels of risk and 
profitability. 
 
 We use the following econometric model to test hypothesis 1: 
Model 1 
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i
15
10 i j j i
j 1
Y MANAGER FAMILY COMPANY BANK  LISTED
 M_LNTA M_OEQUITY M_DEPOSIT LAMBDA
LAMBDA*LISTED COUNTRY=
= α + α +α + α + α +α+ α + α + α + α
+ α + γ + ε∑
 
where: Yi  is either a measure of asset risk (SDROA, SDROE and M_LLP), default 
risk (Z, ZP, ZP1 and ZP2) or a measure of profitability (the mean of the return on 
average assets -M_ROA - and the mean of the return on average equity - M_ROE-)
15
; 
MANAGER, FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of stock held 
respectively by managers/directors, families/individuals, non-financial companies, 
and banks; LISTED is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is 
listed on the stock market and zero otherwise; M_LNTA is the mean of the natural 
logarithm of total assets; M_OEQUITY is the mean of the ratio of equity to total assets 
                                                 
15 We do not include an independent variable reflecting asset risk when we consider profitability as the 
dependent variable because we have a high degree of colinearity between our ownership variables and 
asset risk.  
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orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT is the mean of the ratio of deposits to total 
assets; LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage 
Probit model; COUNTRY is a country dummy variable.  
 
We consider five categories of owners that may influence the risk-taking 
behavior of banks (MANAGER, FAMILY, COMPANY, BANK and INSTITUT). In our 
specification, we remove INSTITUT from Model 1 in order to use institutional 
investors as a benchmark ownership share. The theoretical link between risk and 
institutional ownership is the most settled. As institutional investors hold shares in 
sufficiently diversified investment portfolios, they are assumed to favor all positive 
net present value investments at the individual bank level. As shareholders, 
institutional investors are indifferent to the riskiness of an investment in a specific 
bank and are only concerned about expected return. By removing INSTITUT from our 
set of independent variables, we are able to analyze, with Model 1, if a shift in 
ownership from institutional investors to another category of owners results in an 
increase or a decrease in risk and profitability (see Appendix 2 for details). The 
excluded shareholder group INSTITUT is the benchmark against which the signs and 
the magnitudes of the coefficients on the four other ownership shares are evaluated.  
The theory regarding the attitude of individuals and families toward risk 
stipulates that their portfolio is less diversified than those of other shareholders, 
particularly institutional investors, and they therefore have incentives to take less risk 
because if the bank fails they lose more compared to other shareholders. We therefore 
expect that a shift in equity from institutional investors (INSTITUT) to 
individuals/families (FAMILY) implies a decrease in risk
16
 ( 2α  negative).  
Previous studies that analyzed the incentives of managers/directors to take risk 
were mostly dedicated to US firms. Most studies have shown that when a 
manager/director holds a small share of the bank’s equity, she/he may have incentives 
to take less risk. If the bank fails, she/he loses both her reputation and human capital 
investment. Our MANAGER variable is very close to the proxy used by Saunders et al. 
(1990) which is computed as the number of shares held by executive and directors 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Note that the underlying 
                                                 
16 We give here the expected sign for the measures of asset risk (SDROA, SDROE and M_LLP). We 
expect the opposite sign for the default risk measures (Z and ZP) as a lower Z-score value implies a 
higher probability of failure.   
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assumption in the literature is that a low proportion of stocks held by managers is 
associated with a low share of the bank’s stocks in the managers’ non-human wealth. 
Also, a higher proportion of stocks held by managers is assumed to align their interest 
with those of shareholders as long as the larger investment in the bank’s stocks does 
not prevent them from holding diversified portfolios. In our study, we do not have 
information about managers’ wealth and the level of diversification of their 
investment portfolio. We assume that the portfolio of managers is less diversified than 
those of our benchmark, institutional investors. We therefore expect a negative 
coefficient for the variable MANAGER ( 1α  negative).  
We also consider shares held by non-financial companies (COMPANY). Banks 
with a large portion of stocks held by firms are prone to increase the riskiness of loans 
granted to owners. Moreover, if a bank is behind an industrial group, the group 
management will have incentives to manipulate the bank to maximize the wealth of 
ultimate owners. Therefore, banks that are controlled by firms might have incentives 
to encourage riskier strategies than other categories such as families and individuals. 
Also, it could be argued that non-financial companies might hold sufficiently 
diversified asset portfolios just like institutional investors.  If this is the case, their risk 
incentives could be aligned with those of institutional investors. However our data do 
not provide information on the structure of their investment portfolios. The impact on 
bank risk of a shift in equity from institutional investors to non-financial companies is 
therefore undetermined ( 3α  non significant or positive/negative). 
The fourth category of shareholders is represented by banks (BANK). As we 
can see in Tables 3 and 4, banks hold important stakes in other banks. When a bank 
owns another bank, the important risk-return relationship and strategies are expected 
to be at the parent company, and not at its subsidiary firm. However, banks as a 
shareholder might encourage relatively conservative risk-taking strategies at the 
individual bank level for both safety net reasons and reputation concerns. In the event 
of financial distress or failure, the parent bank is expected to support its subsidiary 
which can be costly. We expect a negative coefficient for the variable BANK ( 4α  
negative).  
 
 Control variables are introduced to account for size differences (natural 
logarithm of total assets M_LNTA), business differences (deposits to total assets 
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M_DEP) and leverage differences (equity to total assets M_EQUITY). Alternative 
control variables (the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of net non-interest 
income to net operating income), are also introduced to check for robustness. Because 
M_LNTA and M_EQUITY are highly correlated, the leverage ratio is orthogonalized 
with total assets (M_OEQUITY). As the information on the ownership structure of our 
sample of banks is invariant through time (1999-2005 period) and as our measure of 
asset risk and default risk are computed using the standard deviations of ROA and 
ROE, we conduct cross-section regressions. We therefore compute the means of our 
three control variables over the whole sample period. We also control for possible 
country specific effects by including country dummies (COUNTRY).  
 We further check if publicly-held banks behave differently compared to 
privately-owned banks, by including in Model 1 a dummy variable, LISTED, which 
takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise. 
This dummy variable is expected to capture differences in risk and profitability for 
listed and non-listed banks. Market exposure is expected to influence the behavior of 
publicly-held firms. However, the effect of market exposure on risk is unclear. On the 
one hand, market discipline should impose strong incentives on banks to conduct their 
business in a safe, sound and efficient manner, including an incentive to maintain a 
high level of equity capital to face potential future losses. On the other hand, publicly-
held banks can have access to additional equity at a lower cost than privately-owned 
banks. Public banks might consequently have a greater ability to become larger and 
make acquisitions. They also have a higher degree of freedom to manage their equity 
and meet the regulatory capital requirement, which gives them more flexibility to 
invest in risky projects with a higher expected return. Market forces might therefore 
impose a higher risk-adjusted return for public banks. The expected sign associated to 
the variable LISTED is therefore undetermined ( 5α  non significant or 
positive/negative). 
 We might potentially have two endogeneity problems in our regressions, one 
with our ownership variables, which are continuous, and another one with the binary 
variable LISTED. We deal with these two problems separately.  
 Some studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999, Gugler and 
Weigland, 2003) raise the problem that ownership might be endogenous as it might be 
influenced by the level of performance and risk of the firm. In our study, it can be 
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argued that investors can be attracted by banks with different risk levels. Some 
investors might simply choose to invest in banks with higher risk profiles in order to 
maximize their utility. We test for the presence of an endogeneity bias in the 
estimated equation for the three ownership variables for which we might encounter 
such a problem (COMPANY, BANK and INSTITUT) by using the Hausman test. We 
consider several instrumental variables related to the legal environment of the banking 
system and to the nature of the bank’s activities
17
. We verify that for each of our 
ownership variables, we have at least one instrument which is not weak. The 
Hausman tests show that the endogeneity problem is not a major issue
18
, which 
implies that OLS should be an efficient estimator.  
 The choice for a bank to become public or remain private also raises potential 
endogeneity issues in our econometric specification. Indeed, banks will make their 
choice to become listed on a stock market or remain private on the basis of the 
expected future changes in growth and profitability. We account for a possible 
endogeneity of the choice to be public or private by using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage approach as in Givoly et al. (2007) and Nichols et al. (2009). In a first stage, we 
use a Probit model to determine the variables that influence the choice of the bank to 
be publicly or privately owned. We then use the estimates of the Probit model to 
compute the inverse Mills ratio for each sample bank (LAMBDA)
19
. In the second 
stage, we introduce the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in Model 1. By 
including LAMBDA in Model 1, we control for the correlation between LISTED and 
the second stage errors to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. We also introduce 
                                                 
17 We consider several instrumental variables. First, we differentiate the banking systems according to 
their legal environment. We use the database of La Porta et al. (1998) which groups the countries into 
four general legal families: English common law origin; countries of French civil law origin; countries 
of German civil law origin; and countries of Scandinavian civil law origin. Second, we classify the 
banks of our sample according to the nature of their activities (proportion of subsidiaries abroad, focus 
or diversification, extent of loan activities in the balance sheet, …). The strategies pursued by banks 
will not change much over time and might influence the choice of shareholders.  
18 The Hausman tests show that the null hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected for INSTITUT (except 
for SDROA and Z), COMPANY (except for SDROA) and BANK (except for ZP1 and ROE). 
19 We use mean tests to compare balance sheet and income statement characteristics between listed and 
non-listed banks (as in Table 2). We retain 11 ratios out of the 24 initially examined ratios which are 
significantly different between listed and non-listed banks: consumer loans/total assets, total earning 
assets/total assets, total deposits/total assets, cash/total assets, ROA, liquid assets/total assets, net 
loans/total assets, asset growth rate, market funding/total assets, equity/total assets. These variables are 
used to model the selection of public versus private status. The results from the Probit model are 
available from the authors on request. The Pseudo R-square statistic indicates that the model explains 
almost 68% of the cross-sectional variation in the choice of public-private status within our sample.  
 18
an interaction variable combining LISTED and LAMBDA to allow the coefficient to 
vary between listed and non-listed banks.  
 
 The second objective of our paper is to further investigate the issue of market 
discipline. We test the extent to which market forces influence the behavior of public 
banks under different ownership structures. As discussed above, two different effects 
can be expected from market discipline on the behavior of public banks: (i) a decrease 
in risk if market forces moderate the incentives of banks dominated by institutional 
investors or other shareholder categories rationally inclined to take higher risks; (ii) an 
increase in risk if market forces align the objectives of public banks to generate faster 
growth and to obtain a higher risk-adjusted return. As market forces might line-up the 
objective of listed banks, we expect that their ownership structure will no more affect 
their risk level.  These two opposite effects of market forces on the risk behavior of 
public banks lead us to test the two following alternative hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Market discipline can mitigate risk in public banks that are owned or 
controlled by shareholder categories that would otherwise be inclined to take higher 
risk in a private bank.  
Hypothesis 2b: Different ownership structures do not imply different levels of risk 
and profitability for publicly-held banks.  
 
For this purpose, we estimate an augmented model that captures the interaction 
between the different categories of owners
20
 (FAMILY, COMPANY, BANK and 
INSTITUT) and the dummy variable LISTED which indicates if a bank is listed or not. 
We therefore use the following model to test the alternative hypotheses 2a and 2b: 
Model 2 
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i
5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i
9 i 10 11 i 12 i
15
j j i
j 1
Y FAMILY COMPANY BANK FAMILY*LISTED
COMPANY*LISTED BANK*LISTED M_LNTA M_OEQUITY
M_DEPOSIT LISTED LAMBDA LAMBDA*LISTED
COUNTRY=
= β + β +β + β + β+β + β + β + β+ β +β + β + β
+ γ + ε∑
 
                                                 
20 As managers hold stocks in only one non-listed bank, we cannot consider the variable MANAGER in 
Model 2. 
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As in Model 1, we use INSTITUT as a benchmark. Again, as we remove 
INSTITUT from the set of independent variables, the estimated coefficient of each 
interaction variable refers to a substitution between each ownership component and 
the INSTITUT component (see Appendix 2 for details).  
Interaction variables measure the impact of market exposure on the 
relationship between the proportion of equity held by each category of owner and the 
dependent variable. A negative and significant value of the sum of the coefficients of 
the variable COMPANY and the interaction variable COMPANY*LISTED 
( 2 5 0β +β < ) will indicate that a shift in equity from institutional investors to non-
financial companies is associated with a decrease in risk for listed banks. Such a result 
will be consistent with our hypothesis 2a. If the sum of these two coefficients is not 
significantly different from zero, then our model will highlight that a change in the 
ownership structure of listed banks will not affect their risk level, which is consistent 
with hypothesis 2b. 
 
4. Results  
Tables 9 and 10 show the results obtained for Models 1 and 2. Because, as 
discussed above, we do not face strong endogeneity issues, we use OLS estimation 
techniques with the Heckman correction
21
. We also correct for heteroskedasticity 
following White’s methodology.  As we remove the ownership component 
“institutional investors” from Models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient associated to 
each ownership component has to be interpreted as the effect of a substitution 
between this component and the INSTITUT component (see Appendix 2 for details).  
Our results are consistent with hypothesis 1. We find that the portion of total 
equity held by different categories of shareholders is significant in explaining risk and 
profitability differences (see Table 9).  
First, as expected, our results show that higher portions of total stock held by 
individuals/families (compensated in our approach by a decrease in the INSTITUT 
component) are associated with lower asset risk and credit risk. But, interestingly, we 
also find that a shift in equity from institutional investors to individuals/families is not 
significantly associated with a decrease in profitability. As argued above, such 
                                                 
21 We also estimate Models 1 and 2 without the Heckman correction when the inverse Mills ratio 
(LAMBDA) is not significant. The results regarding our variables of interest are unchanged.  
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shareholders hold less diversified portfolios than institutional investors and are often 
involved in the management of such banks. Regarding our default risk measures, the 
results show that a higher stake of individuals/families is associated with a lower 
probability of default (Z).  
Second, we find that the coefficients associated to the variable BANK are not 
significant when the dependent variables are asset risk measures (SDROA and 
SDROE) or profitability measures (ROA and ROE). These results indicate that a shift 
in equity from institutional investors to banks does not imply a different level of asset 
risk and profitability. Also, we find a negative and significant relationship at the ten 
percent level between the BANK ownership component and the credit risk measure 
(M_LLP). This result might support the hypothesis that, as shareholders, banking 
institutions encourage relatively conservative risk-taking strategies but only for 
traditional lending activities. In addition, our results show that default risk (Z) is lower 
when the portion of shares held by such banking institutions increases. 
 Third, we do not find any significant coefficient associated to the variable 
COMPANY. A shift in equity from institutional investors to non-financial companies 
does not imply a change in asset risk, default risk and profitability. Such a result 
suggests that institutional investors and non-financial companies might have similar 
risk-return objectives. 
Lastly, we find a significant and negative relationship between the variable 
MANAGER and our credit risk measure (M_LLP). A shift in ownership from 
institutional investors to managers is associated to a lower level of credit risk but our 
results also highlight a higher probability of default (Z). Meanwhile, we find that a 
higher involvement of managers in equity has a positive impact on profitability. 
However, it should be noted that our data do not allow us to infer any accurate 
relationship between manager involvement and risk. As shown in Table 3 and Table 
A2, managers rarely hold stocks in their own company in our sample. Moreover, 7 out 
of the 8 banks in which they have a stake are listed banks.   
 Regarding the influence of market forces on bank performance, the coefficient 
associated to the variable LISTED in Model 1 is not significant. At first sight, there 
seems to be no significant difference in risk and profitability between listed and non 
listed banks suggesting that market forces might not strongly influence the risk 
behavior of listed banks in a specific way.  
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                Insert Table 9 here 
 
We further investigate the issue of market discipline with Model 2 by 
considering the interaction between the portion of equity held by each category of 
owner and the exposure of banks to market forces (see Table 10)
22
.  
First, for non-listed banks, we find a negative and significant relationship 
between FAMILY and two of our risk measures (SDROE and M_LLP). Therefore, the 
above result indicating lower asset risk when families/individuals hold a higher 
proportion of stocks (compensated by a decrease in INSTITUT) holds for non-listed 
banks.  
Second, our results highlight that, for listed banks, a shift in equity from 
institutional investors to non-financial companies or individuals/families does not 
imply a change in asset risk, default risk and profitability (except for SDROA for 
FAMILY, but only at the 7.64% level). These results are consistent with hypothesis 2b 
that changes in the ownership structure of listed banks do not lead to changes in risk. 
Meanwhile, our results show that a decrease in the proportion of equity held by 
institutional investors, offset by an increase in equity held by banks, implies a lower 
credit risk and probability of default, but only for listed banks. Market forces might 
therefore moderate the risk taking of banks with higher stakes by banking institutions 
when they are listed.   
                      Insert Table 10 here 
 
 On the whole, our analysis shows that different ownership structures imply 
different levels of bank risk, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. We find that a 
higher involvement of either individuals/families or banking institutions implies a 
decrease in asset risk and default risk, which is not offset by lower profitability. Our 
results also show that a shift in equity from institutional investors to non-financial 
companies does not involve any changes in asset risk, default risk and profitability 
suggesting identical risk-return preferences of both categories of shareholders. When 
we further take into account the impact of market exposure, we find that changes in 
the ownership structure of publicly-held banks do not strongly affect risk. However, 
                                                 
22 We do not include MANAGER in Model 2 because, in our sample, only one bank involving 
managerial shareholding is not listed (see Table 3). 
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to some extent, credit risk and default risk are lower in listed banks when equity 
stakes are transferred from institutional investors to banking institutions.   
 
5. Deeper investigation and robustness checks
23
 
In order to further examine issues related to the influence of ownership 
structure on the risk-taking behavior of banks, we carry out a deeper investigation of 
our sample. 
 
Ownership Dispersion/Concentration within each category of shareholders  
We account for ownership dispersion/concentration. We estimate the impact of 
the dispersion/concentration of ownership by augmenting Model 1 with interaction 
variables involving the different categories of owners (MANAGER, FAMILY, 
INSTITUT, COMPANY and BANK) and their respective Herfindahl index 
(HERF_MANAGER, HERF_FAMILY, HERF_INSTITUT, HERF_COMPANY and 
HERF_BANK). The results are presented in Table A3. Our results show that the 
degree of ownership concentration of families/individuals, industrial companies and 
banking institutions does not influence the relationship between ownership changes 
and the risk-taking behavior of banks. We also run our estimations on the two sub-
samples of non-listed and listed banks
24
. Our results show that ownership 
concentration does not matter in the relationship between ownership structure and 
bank risk for both listed and non-listed banks. We only find, for non-listed banks, that 
a higher involvement of families/individuals associated to a higher ownership 
concentration implies a decrease in asset risk, but no change in profitability. 
 
Size effect 
We also conduct our estimations separately for large banks (total assets > 1 
billion Euros) and small banks (total assets < 1 billion Euros) to further check for size 
effects on the relationship between ownership structure and banks’ behavior in terms 
of risk taking. Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix present the results obtained for 
                                                 
23 Some of the estimation results discussed in this section are not presented in the paper but are 
available from the authors on request. 
24 We do not include MANAGER in these estimations because there is only one non-listed bank in 
which managers/directors hold equity.  
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Model 1
25
. Shifts in equity are significant in explaining risk differences for both 
samples of large and small banks.  A shift in equity from institutional investors to 
individuals/families implies lower asset risk and lower default risk for both small and 
large banks. Moreover, a higher involvement of individuals/families in small banks 
leads to a higher level of profitability suggesting higher efficiency in management. 
Also, our results show that a shift in equity from institutional investors to non-
financial companies does not involve a change in asset risk, profitability and default 
risk for large banks, whereas it implies a decrease in asset risk for small banks.  
 
Reliance on market debt 
We further test the impact of market exposure on the risk-taking behavior of 
banks under different ownership structure profiles by using another proxy. We 
consider that a bank heavily reliant on market debt is likely to be influenced by 
market forces even if it is not listed on a stock market. We therefore construct a 
dummy variable based on the ratio of market debt plus uninsured deposits to total 
assets. We consider that banks with a ratio higher than the median of the sample can 
be effectively disciplined by the market. We run our Model 2 by using this dummy 
variable to construct the interaction variables (see Table A6 in appendix). We find 
that a shift in equity from institutional investors to individual/families implies lower 
asset and default risk for banks which have a relatively low ratio of market debt. Our 
results also show that changes in the ownership structure of banks which are strongly 
reliant on market debt do not affect asset and default risk. These results are consistent 
with our hypothesis that market forces align the risk-taking behavior of banks. 
 
Nature of main shareholder 
 Finally, to be consistent with previous studies on ownership in banking, we 
also classify banks according to the nature of their main category of shareholders. The 
objective of using such a classification is to analyze if the risk-taking behavior of 
banks is different according to the nature of the main category of shareholders. We 
run a differently specified regression on our subsample of 191 banks in which the 
major shareholder holds more than 50% of total equity. We have in our sample of 249 
banks: (i) 0 manager-owned bank; (ii) 4 family and individual-owned banks; (iii) 14 
                                                 
25 The distribution of banks according to the percentage of equity held by each category of shareholder 
does not allow us to accurately run Model 2 for the sub-samples of small and large banks.  
 24
institutional investor-owned banks; (iv) 22 company-owned banks, and (v) 126 bank-
owned banks (see Table 4). We create the following four dummy variables which take 
the value of one when ownership is higher than 50% of total equity and 0 otherwise: 
FAMILY_OWNED, INSTITUT_OWNED, COMPANY_OWNED and BANK_OWNED. 
We do not consider manager-owned banks in our estimations because no banks have a 
majority of equity held by this category of shareholders (see Table 4). Table A7 in the 
appendix shows the results of the estimations
26
. Our results show that banks which are 
majority-owned by families/individuals exhibit a lower asset risk level (SDROE and 
M_LLP) but not a lower profitability. We also find that banks which are majority-
owned by other banking institutions exhibit a lower credit risk.  
 In addition, we also estimate the same model by considering that there is a 
majority ownership when a category of owner holds a percentage of total equity 
strictly above 33%. Our findings are unaltered for the variables of interest. Our results 
therefore highlight that both the degree of involvement of shareholders and the nature 
of the main category of shareholders influence the attitude of banks toward risk. 
 
Robustness checks 
Several robustness checks are also performed.  First, we estimate Model 1 and 
Model 2 using the restricted sample of 198 banks for which the sum of the different 
equity components is at least equal to 99%. We consider this restricted sample to 
ensure that our results are not biased by the fact that some information regarding 
ownership structure might be missing or not reported in the Bankscope dataset that we 
use. We also estimate Models 1 and 2 on a subsample from which we exclude 
observations with a value of zero for the proportion of equity held by institutional 
investors. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
 Second, we estimate Model 1 on the two sub-samples of privately-owned and 
publicly-held banks. Our results regarding our ownership variables are unchanged. 
We find that a shift in equity from institutional investors to individuals/families 
implies a decrease in asset risk and default risk whereas a higher involvement of non-
financial companies does not imply any changes in risk and profitability. For listed 
banks, our results show that bank ownership structure changes do not affect risk 
                                                 
26 The limited number of banks for which we have a majority owner and our specific regression 
specification which is reliant on dummy variables do not allow us to introduce interaction variables as 
in  Model 2. 
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taking, except that risk is lower when equity stakes are transferred from institutional 
investors to banking institutions.   
Third, we also run separate regressions introducing our ownership variables 
one by one along with the control variables. We find that a higher involvement of 
institutional investors implies a higher probability of default for both listed and non-
listed banks. Our results also show that a higher involvement of individuals/families 
implies a lower asset risk, but only for non-listed banks. A higher proportion of equity 
held by either non-financial companies or banking institutions does not affect risk 
taking, both for privately-owned and publicly-held banks.  
Fourth, we also perform a number of robustness checks that are specification 
related. Other control variables to account for business differences are introduced in 
the estimations such as the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of net non-
interest income to net operating income. Our conclusions regarding the inclusion of 
the ownership variables remain unchanged. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks  
 The objective of this study is to analyze if different ownership structures are 
associated with different levels of risk and profitability in both privately owned and 
publicly held banks. We differentiate five categories of shareholders that are assumed 
to have different risk-taking incentives (managers/directors, institutional investors, 
non-financial companies, individuals/families, and banks). We use the proportion of 
equity held by institutional investors as a benchmark ownership share to evaluate the 
impact of changes in ownership structure on risk and profitability. Our aim is also to 
assess if publicly held and privately owned banks respond differently to such changes 
in terms of risk and profitability.  We hence analyze the influence of market discipline 
by testing if ownership structure changes imply different levels of risk and 
profitability for listed banks.  
 Working on a panel of European commercial banks and using both asset risk 
and default risk measures, we find that changes in ownership structure are significant 
in explaining risk differences. However, by investigating the relationship further we 
note that such findings are mainly accurate for privately owned banks.  
 Specifically, we show that a shift in equity from institutional investors to 
either individuals/families or banking institutions implies a decrease in asset risk and 
default risk, but no change in profitability. This result is consistent with the conjecture 
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that because individuals/families hold less diversified portfolios than institutional 
investors, they have incentives to take less risk. Regarding banking institutions, when 
their stakes in other banks are higher, they seem to encourage relatively conservative 
risk-taking strategies in their subsidiaries possibly for reputation concerns. 
Meanwhile, our results show that a shift in equity from institutional investors to non-
financial companies does not involve changes in risk and profitability; this suggests 
that institutional investors and non-financial companies have similar risk-return 
objectives in the banks they are involved in. We also note that the level of ownership 
concentration/dispersion within each category of shareholders does not influence the 
relationship between ownership structure and risk. 
 We further find no significant differences in asset risk and default risk 
between publicly-held and privately-owned banks. Moreover, unlike for private 
banks, for public banks ownership structure changes do not affect risk taking. Market 
forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of public banks and the ownership 
structure is no more a determinant to explain risk differences. Our results merely 
highlight that a higher involvement of banking institutions in public banks implies a 
lower exposure to credit risk and a lower probability of default. As bank supervisors 
provide guidelines for banks on safety and soundness, a close look at both the 
ownership structure and the nature of equity (public and tradable/ private and non 
tradable) could be important. 
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Table 1. Distribution of banks by country 
 All banks Non-listed banks Listed banks 
Austria 14 11 3 
Belgium 7 7 0 
Denmark 19 2 17 
Finland 2 0 2 
France 64 58 6 
Germany 39 33 6 
Greece 7 0 7 
Ireland 5 1 4 
Italy 17 4 13 
Luxembourg 33 32 1 
Netherlands 7 6 1 
Portugal 2 0 2 
Spain 15 3 12 
Sweden 2 0 2 
Switzerland 3 2 1 
United Kingdom 13 10 3 
Total 249 169 80 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for our panel of 249 European Commercial banks, on average over the period 1999-2005 
 LOANS DEP EQUITY EXPENSES LLP ROA ROE LIQUID OBS TA SDROA SDROE Z ZP 
Large sample of commercial  banks available under Bankscope (1586 banks) 
Mean 46.58 26.72 12.13 1.95 0.68 0.82 8.03 29.16 29.05 10 410 1.14 8.20 46.70 47.26 
Maximum 99.97 97.64 69.52 77.64 14.49 19.24 39.95 100.00 857.47 1 330 000 53.26 216.02 590.40 496.77 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -14.98 -20.00 -38.25 0.00 0.00 0.991 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.37 
Std. Dev. 29.72 26.73 11.77 3.04 1.95 2.28 9.97 26.75 75.07 64 435 3.04 14.45 65.03 61.57 
Our sample of 249 banks 
Mean 50.15 39.06 9.41 1.58 0.54 0.81 9.52 24.50 32.15 20 200 0.58 6.98 44.03 37.17 
Maximum 94.71 93.31 68.24 41.78 9.09 16.59 30.82 87.09 887.90 839 000 7.67 143.06 511.66 190.76 
Minimum 0.76 0.00 1.06 0.04 -10.99 -4.04 -38.66 0.24 0.02 4 554 0.01 0.003 0.56 0.51 
Std. Dev. 24.66 26.04 8.51 2.80 2.00 1.43 9.23 20.65 73.68 83 900 0.94 12.81 56.13 32.35 
T-statistic of the mean test -2.06** -6.92*** 4.42*** 1.91* 1.03 0.09 -2.34** 3.16*** -0.61 -1.76* 5.78*** 1.37 0.68 3.92*** 
Non-listed banks (169) 
Mean 45.55 31.65 9.71 1.35 0.48 0.63 8.02 28.36 33.56 3 820 0.61 7.77 43.63 36.98 
Maximum 94.71 93.31 66.78 7.73 9.09 4.87 30.82 87.09 887.90 52 400 7.67 143.06 511.66 190.76 
Minimum 0.76 0.00 1.47 0.04 -10.99 -4.04 -38.66 0.31 0.02 4 554 0.01 0.003 0.56 0.51 
Std. Dev. 25.96 25.98 8.81 1.06 2.41 1.04 9.78 23.18 86.32 7 990 0.97 14.74 58.64 32.35 
Listed banks (80) 
Mean 59.87 54.71 8.79 2.05 0.66 1.18 12.67 16.33 29.10 54 800 0.51 5.32 44.87 37.50 
Maximum 88.84 86.94 68.24 41.78 3.39 16.59 25.55 47.28 141.52 839 000 5.58 50.93 396.34 136.62 
Minimum 9.09 3.84 1.06 0.04 -0.98 -2.86 -20.21 0.24 0.90 57 462 0.01 0.28 1.57 1.27 
Std. Dev. 18.28 18.09 7.84 4.68 0.54 1.98 7.00 9.87 32.76 142 000 0.88 6.96 50.83 27.04 
T-statistic of the mean test -4.43*** -7.15*** 0.79 -1.84* -0.66 -2.87*** -3.81*** 4.45*** 0.44 -4. 65*** 0.79 1.41 -0.16 0.46 
  
T statistics test for the null:"Descriptive statistics are not different between the two samples considered".***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for a bilateral test. Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage except TA which is in million of euros): LOANS = net loans/total assets; DEP = 
deposits/total assets; EQUITY= equity/total assets; EXPENSES =personnel expenses/total assets; LLP = loan loss provision/net loans; ROA = return on average assets; ROE= 
return on average equity; LIQUID = liquid assets/total assets;  OBS= off balance sheet/ total assets;  TA= total assets (millions Euros); SDROA= standard deviation of the ROA; 
SDROE = standard deviation of the ROE; Z=Z-score = )(100 average ROE / SDROE+  ;  
ZP = ZP-score = 
average ROA average (Total equities / Total assets)
SDROA SDROA
+ . 
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Table 3. Number of banks for which the ownership variables are different from zero and 
percentage of stock held by the different categories of owners  
  MANAGER a FAMILY INSTITUT COMPANY BANK 
  =0 >0  
 
=0 
 
>0  =0 >0  
 
=0 
 
>0  
 
=0 
 
>0  
Whole sample (249 banks) 
Number of 
banks 
    (%) 
 
241 
(96.78) 
8 
(3.22) 
224 
(89.95) 
25 
(10.05) 
194 
(77.91) 
55 
(22.09) 
171 
(68.67) 
78 
(31.33) 
69 
(27.71) 
180 
(72.29) 
Mean  
9.51 
 
21.90 
 
35.40 
 
39.48 
 
81.52 
Max.  
33.72 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
Min.  
0.40 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.69 
Percentage 
of equity 
Std  
11.16 
 
31.33 
 
37.83 
 
38.33 
 
30.73 
Non-listed banks (169 banks) 
Number of 
banks 
    (%) 
 
168 
(99.5) 
1 
(0.5) 
160 
(94.68) 
9 
(5.32) 
151 
(89.35) 
18 
(10.65) 
135 
(79.89) 
34 
(20.11) 
34 
(79.89) 
135 
(23.74) 
Mean  
16.48 
 
50.39 
 
71.86 
 
66.31 
 
93.73 
Max.  
16.48 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
Min.  
16.48 
 
0.07 
 
0.63 
 
0.10 
 
20.86 
Percentage 
of equity 
Std  
- 
 
38.52 
 
38.98 
 
37.45 
 
17.88 
Listed banks (80 banks) 
Number of 
banks 
    (%) 
 
73 
(91.25) 
7 
(8.75) 
64 
(80.00) 
16 
(20.00) 
43 
(53.75) 
37 
(46.25) 
36 
(45.00) 
44 
(55.00) 
35 
(43.75) 
45 
(56.25) 
Mean  
8.51 
 
5.87 
 
16.16 
 
19.8 
 
44.87 
Max.  
33.72 
 
17.14 
 
79.86 
 
99.97 
 
99.9 
Min.  
0.4 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.69 
Percentage 
of equity 
Std  
11.67 
 
4.25 
 
18 
 
24.81 
 
32.19 
Five categories of owners are considered: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial companies 
(COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) institutional investors - 
insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - (INSTITUT). 
a For example, in the whole sample, we have 241 banks in which managers do not hold equity and 8 banks in which 
managers hold equity. We also present the percentage of banks for which the variable MANAGER is equal to zero 
(96.78), as well as the percentage of equity held on average by the managers in the 8 banks in which they have a stake 
(9.51%).  
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Table 4. Distribution of our sample of privately-owned and publicly-owned banks 
according to the percentage of equity held by each category of shareholder  
 Percentage of equity held 
 0 ]0-5] ]5-33] ]33-50] ]50-75] ]75-100] 
Number of non listed banks (total of 169 banks) 
MANAGER 168 0 1 0 0 0 
FAMILY 160 1 2 2 1 3 
INSTITUT 151 3 1 1 3 11 
COMPANY 135 2 7 2 5 17 
BANK 34 0 4 5 4 122 
Number of listed banks (total of 80 banks) 
MANAGER 73 3 3 1 0 0 
FAMILY 64 8 8 0 0 0 
INSTITUT 43 12 19 2 2 1 
COMPANY 36 13 24 2 3 3 
BANK 34 0 4 5 4 122 
Five categories of owners are considered: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial 
companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
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Table 5. Risk measures and default risk measures according to the shareholder type 
and the percentage of equity held 
  Percentage of equity held 
  0 ]0-5] ]5-33] ]33-50] ]50-75] ]75-100] 
SDROA 0.57 0.47 0.99 0.19 - - 
SDROE 6.88 9.20 12.23 2.70 - - 
M_LLP 0.32 0.71 0.48 0.57 - - 
Z 44.60 33.15 18.11 44.91 - - 
ZP 50.38 33.32 19.14 50.96 - - 
ZP1 4.25 3.37 2.27 8.93 - - 
ZP2 46.13 29.95 16.87 42.04 - - 
 
 
 
 
MANAGER 
Observations 241 3 4 1 0 0 
SDROA 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.12 0.15 
SDROE 7.24 5.31 4.51 7.27 2.23 2.27 
M_LLP 0.34 -0.22 0.71 0.26 0.75 0.14 
Z 44.19 28.35 39.21 109.51 49.37 49.96 
ZP 50.80 31.09 31.79 95.20 53.26 48.98 
ZP1 4.26 3.58 3.55 7.69 4.69 3.22 
ZP2 46.54 27.70 28.24 87.51 48.57 45.75 
 
 
 
 
FAMILY 
Observations 224 9 10 2 1 3 
SDROA 0.57 0.20 0.49 0.34 0.25 1.41 
SDROE 7.20 3.11 6.29 4.24 3.56 11.45 
M_LLP 0.17 0.29 0.74 0.46 1.38 1.80 
Z 43.37 86.80 30.75 36.54 65.11 16.43 
ZP 49.32 109.34 26.90 43.89 59.90 16.13 
ZP1 4.15 8.63 3.29 3.27 4.83 1.49 
ZP2 45.16 100.00 23.61 40.61 55.06 14.63 
 
 
 
INSTITUT 
 Observations 194 15 20 3 5 12 
SDROA 0.62 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.93 
SDROE 7.19 3.02 4.66 1.83 2.54 14.53 
M_LLP 0.28 0.49 0.34 0.46 0.64 0.50 
Z 37.51 84.66 54.60 107.90 70.97 28.31 
ZP 47.84 48.98 67.88 63.66 74.89 24.54 
ZP1 3.91 5.60 6.47 5.08 4.69 2.16 
ZP2 43.98 43.38 61.41 58.58 70.19 22.38 
 
 
 
COMPANY 
 Observations 171 15 31 4 8 20 
SDROA 0.75 0.30 0.37 0.14 0.31 0.58 
SDROE 8.78 3.57 6.03 1.79 3.68 7.04 
M_LLP 0.84 0.52 0.71 1.05 0.83 -0.11 
Z 32.15 35.58 47.26 78.66 43.10 48.09 
ZP 34.69 34.30 65.79 67.14 46.15 55.22 
ZP1 3.72 4.59 7.13 6.50 3.77 3.97 
ZP2 30.96 29.71 58.65 60.63 42.37 51.24 
 
 
 
BANK 
Observations 69 5 19 8 17 131 
The variables MANAGER, FAMILY, INSTITUT, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of 
stock held respectively by managers/directors, families/individuals, institutional investors, non-
financial companies, and banks. 
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): 
SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of return on 
average equity, M_LLP= Mean of the ratio of loan loss provision to net loans over the sample period; 
Z=Z-score = )(100 average ROE / SDROE+  ;  
ZP = ZP-score = ZP1 + ZP2 =
average ROA average (Total equities / Total assets)
SDROA SDROA
+ ; ZP1=measure 
of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk.  
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Table 6. Ownership dispersion by shareholder category 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Whole sample  
HERF 0.775 0.297 0.054 1 
By shareholder category 
HERF_MANAGER 0.948 0.145 0.589 1 
HERF_FAMILY 0.654 0.351 0 1 
HERF_INSTITUT 0.696 0.349 0 1 
HERF_COMPANY 0.777 0.276 0.170 1 
HERF_BANK 0.888 0.224 0 1 
HERF is the Herfindahl index computed when we consider all the categories of shareholders together.  
HERF_j represents the Herfindahl index computed for the category of shareholder j (by considering only 
shareholders who hold equity). Our Herfindahl index is defined for each bank i as 
n 2
j=1
jOS∑ , where OSj is 
the ratio of the percentage of equity held by each shareholder for the given category j to the total 
percentage of equity held by all the shareholder of this category j.  
We consider five categories of owners: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial 
companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
 
Table 7. Average number of shareholders by category  
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Whole sample  
 4.73 8.21 1 87 
By Shareholder categories  
MANAGER 1.12 0.35 1 2 
FAMILY 2.48 2.29 1 8 
INSTITUT 2.96 2.81 1 12 
COMPANY 4.25 8.66 1 66 
BANK 2.13 3.95 1 52 
Five categories of owners are considered: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial 
companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
 
Table 8. Ownership concentration and bank risk and profitability 
  Level of concentration MANAGER FAMILY INSTITUT COMPANY BANK 
Less Concentrated 
(HERF≤ 0.5) - 0.43 0.52 0.32 0.23 
More Concentrated 
(HERF>0.5) 0.64 0.50 0.56 0.49 0.54 
SDROA 
T-stat of the mean test - -0.38 -0.10 -1.54 -3.68*** 
Less Concentrated 
(HERF≤ 0.5) - 45.42 34.27 43.38 73.24 
More Concentrated 
(HERF>0.5) 27.10 41.29 57.11 61.78 45.61 
Z 
 
T-stat of the mean test - 0.22 -0.80 -1.15 1.04 
Less Concentrated 
(HERF≤ 0.5) - 1.08 1.10 0.83 0.46 
More Concentrated 
(HERF>0.5) 0.82 1.35 1.58 0.94 0.66 
M_ROA 
T-stat of the mean test t - -0.65 -0.45 -0.61 -1.92* 
 
T statistics test for the null:"Risk and performance are not different for banks with a more or less concentrated 
ownership".***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for a bilateral test. The 
level of concentration is measured by our Herfindahl index (see definition in Table 6); a category of shareholder is 
considered with a more or less concentrated ownership when the Herfindahl index is respectively higher than 0.5
or strictly lower than 0.5. Five categories of owners are considered: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-
financial companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - (INSTITUT). 
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Table 9. Influence of ownership structure on the risk-taking behavior and profitability of banks (Model 1), cross-section OLS regressions 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
CONSTANT 0.200 -3.866 3.456* 38.95 15.63 -2.772 18.40 2.877*** 23.56*** 
 (0.27) (-0.32) (1.83) (1.28) (0.34) (-0.47) (0.45) (3.56) (3.33) 
MANAGER   0.00364 -0.0233 -0.0295* -0.853* -0.576 -0.0654 -0.511 0.0225** 0.299** 
      (0.34) (-0.14) (-1.68) (-1.83) (-1.09) (-0.99) (-1.07) (2.54) (2.39) 
FAMILY   -0.00455* -0.0834*** -0.0179** 0.408** 0.141 -0.00318 0.144 -0.000763 0.00369 
 (-1.72) (-2.77) (-2.27) (2.16) (0.77) (-0.19) (0.84) (-0.21) (0.11) 
COMPANY   -0.00285 0.0369 -0.00973 0.181 -0.00877 -0.0149 0.00613 -0.00196 -0.00268 
 (-1.12) (0.54) (-1.15) (1.31) (-0.07) (-1.04) (0.05) (-0.58) (-0.07) 
BANK  -0.00142 -0.0267 -0.0120* 0.230* 0.0942 -0.00269 0.0969 -0.000967 -0.00681 
 (-0.68) (-1.05) (-1.77) (1.75) (0.73) (-0.17) (0.83) (-0.41) (-0.28) 
M_LNTA  0.0660* 1.189* -0.113 -4.439** -3.657 0.0899 -3.747 -0.0916** -0.347 
 (1.94) (1.89) (-1.24) (-2.17) (-1.20) (0.32) (-1.30) (-2.11) (-1.06) 
M_OEQUITY 0.0660*** -0.00333 -0.0561** -0.262 -0.889 -0.101 -0.788 0.0460** -0.126 
 (6.65) (-0.04) (-2.16) (-0.59) (-1.49) (-1.64) (-1.41) (2.50) (-1.36) 
M_DEPOSIT -0.00237 -0.00944 -0.0114 0.157 0.0907 -0.0655*** 0.156 -0.00697** -0.101*** 
 (-1.11) (-0.25) (-1.29) (0.74) (0.33) (-2.94) (0.60) (-2.32) (-3.75) 
LISTED 0.270 4.585 -0.411 3.652 28.92 8.927* 20.00 -0.447 0.913 
 (0.60) (0.85) (-0.55) (0.17) (0.91) (1.97) (0.72) (-1.08) (0.21) 
LAMBDA 0.0463 1.209 -0.109 1.066 6.554 0.0387 6.516 -0.180*** -2.108*** 
 (1.02) (1.46) (-0.55) (0.36) (1.42) (0.10) (1.48) (-2.85) (-3.27) 
LAMBDA*LISTED -0.188 -3.912 -0.112 2.215 -16.18 -5.897* -10.28 0.164 -1.725 
 (-0.52) (-0.82) (-0.31) (0.16) (-0.72) (-1.81) (-0.52) (0.43) (-0.55) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 244 244 241 242 244 244 244 244 243 
R2 0.296 0.0848 0.105 0.119 0.0571 0.153 0.0542 0.304 0.226 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. 
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of  the return on average assets; SDROE 
= standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of 
bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean 
of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits 
to total assets; LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise; LAMBDA is the inverse Mills 
ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage Probit model. The variables MANAGER, FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of stock held 
respectively by managers/directors, families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. We also include dummy variables to account for country specific 
effects.  
 34 
Table10. Influence of ownership structure on the risk-taking behavior and profitability of listed and non-listed banks (Model 2), cross-section OLS regressions 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
CONSTANT 0( )β  0.336 (0.47) -2.878 (-0.24) 3.869* (1.89) 59.19* (1.83) 4.433 (0.09) -4.294 (-0.68) 8.728 (0.20) 2.772*** (3.59) 24.25*** (3.29) 
-0.00466 -0.0810** -0.0209* 0.283 0.283 0.0146 0.268 0.000322 -0.000599 
FAMILY 1( )β  (-1.55) (-2.49) (-1.95) (1.59) (1.64) (1.15) (1.65) (0.08) (-0.02) 
-0.00311 0.0487 -0.0129 0.0828 0.0878 -0.000719 0.0885 -0.00104 -0.00737 
COMPANY 2( )β  (-0.95) (0.58) (-1.16) (0.51) (0.62) (-0.06) (0.66) (-0.27) (-0.15) 
-0.00210 -0.0315 -0.0147 0.0881 0.234 0.0147 0.219 -0.000351 -0.0175 
BANK 3( )β  (-0.75) (-1.00) (-1.51) (0.62) (1.63) (1.07) (1.65) (-0.12) (-0.56) 
-0.0182 -0.131 0.0133 0.317 -2.054 -0.226 -1.828 -0.0141 -0.0331 
FAMILY*LISTED 4( )β  (-1.38) (-0.73) (0.66) (0.45) (-1.33) (-1.00) (-1.37) (-0.74) (-0.18) 
-0.000409 -0.0719 0.0111 0.209 -0.179 -0.0332 -0.145 -0.00396 -0.00591 
COMPANY*LISTED 5( )β  (-0.09) (-0.82) (1.08) (0.83) (-0.67) (-0.99) (-0.60) (-0.66) (-0.11) 
0.00195 0.0290 0.00854 0.481 -0.445* -0.0532 -0.391* -0.00254 0.0235 
BANK*LISTED 6( )β  (0.43) (0.55) (0.86) (1.56) (-1.68) (-1.55) (-1.67) (-0.47) (0.47) 
0.0656* 1.183* -0.114 -4.434** -3.908 0.0614 -3.970 -0.0902** -0.309 
M_LNTA 7( )β     (1.93) (1.90) (-1.24) (-2.16) (-1.29) (0.23) (-1.38) (-2.07) (-0.93) 
0.0659*** -0.00594 -0.0573** -0.317 -0.833 -0.0944 -0.738 0.0463** -0.129 
M_OEQUITY 8( )β  (6.67) (-0.06) (-2.25) (-0.73) (-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.31) (2.49) (-1.40) 
-0.00209 -0.00657 -0.0108 0.192 0.0658 -0.0687*** 0.134 -0.00702** -0.0978*** 
M_DEPOSIT 9( )β  (-0.96) (-0.17) (-1.23) (0.88) (0.24) (-2.92) (0.51) (-2.25) (-3.53) 
0.188 4.235 -0.992 -22.65 52.67 11.93** 40.74 -0.255 0.0594 
LISTED 10( )β  (0.44) (0.76) (-0.90) (-1.00) (1.31) (2.00) (1.17) (-0.52) (0.01) 
0.0472 1.180 -0.104 1.210 6.397 0.0135 6.384 -0.181*** -2.085*** 
LAMBDA 11( )β  (1.04) (1.46) (-0.52) (0.41) (1.37) (0.04) (1.44) (-2.83) (-3.23) 
-0.182 -3.403 -0.148 2.604 -17.01 -5.922* -11.09 0.177 -1.612 
LAMBDA*LISTED 12( )β  (-0.53) (-0.76) (-0.43) (0.18) (-0.78) (-1.84) (-0.57) (0.47) (-0.51) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Risk level to reject 
1 4
0β + β =  0.0764* 0.228 0.626 0.376 0.249 0.346 0.240 0.458 0.856 
Risk level to reject 2 5 0β + β =  0.311 0.603 0.723 0.159 0.700 0.289 0.788 0.347 0.745 
Risk level to reject 3 6 0β + β =  0.965 0.951 0.0786* 0.0432** 0.342 0.245 0.369 0.519 0.879 
Number of obs. 244 244 241 242 244 244 244 244 243 
R2 0.298 0.0908 0.107 0.128 0.0616 0.159 0.0582 0.302 0.222 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of the return 
on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean  
of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized 
with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise; 
LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage Probit model.  The variables FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of stock held respectively by 
families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. We also include dummy variables to account for country specific effects.  
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Figure 1. Asset risk, default risk, profitability and asset growth rate for public and 
private banks according to their main category of shareholder 
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Note: We use the mode to determine the main category of shareholder of each bank; t represents the T-statistic of the 
bilateral mean test between listed and non-listed banks for banks with the same main category of shareholder. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. We consider five categories of owners: (i) 
managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); 
(iv) banks (BANK); and (v) institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
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Figure 1. (continue) Asset risk, default risk, profitability and asset growth rate for 
public and private banks according to their main category of shareholder 
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t=-5.76***
Note: We use the mode to determine the main category of shareholder of each bank; t represents the T-statistic of the 
bilateral mean  test between listed and non-listed banks for banks with the same main category of shareholder. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. We consider five categories of owners: (i) 
managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); 
(iv) banks (BANK); and (v) institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
t=1.40
t=1.32
t=-1.52 t=1.68* 
t=-3.89*** 
t=-5.47*** t=-6.40*** 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1 Distribution per country of the number of banks for which the ownership 
variables are different from zero and the percentage of stock held by the different 
categories of owners 
 
  MANAGER FAMILY INSTITUT COMPANY BANK 
0 0 2 5 11 
Austria 
(0,00) (0,00) (87,00) (60,73) (74.72) 
1 1 1 2 4 
Belgium 
(16,48) (37,71) (100,00) (64.37) (99.99) 
2 4 8 4 6 
Denmark 
(5,60) (6,22) (19,55) (12,02) (36.56) 
0 1 2 2 2 
Finland 
(0,00) (10,44) (21,84) (7,15) (29.50) 
2 1 7 16 57 
France 
(3,36) (0,07) (37,23) (48,89) (88.94) 
1 2 6 8 25 
Germany 
(2,00) (60,66) (86,09) (77,82) (92.94) 
1 2 3 2 2 
Greece 
(5,96) (12,94) (28,57) (29,97) (13.89) 
0 0 2 4 2 
Irland 
(0,00) (0,00) (15,80) (6.84) (55.55) 
0 5 7 10 14 
Italy 
(0,00) (3,23) (15,55) (23.62) (61.92) 
0 1 4 3 28 
Luxembourg 
(0,00) (66,87) (51,66) (66.70) (98.53) 
0 0 0 1 7 
Netherlands 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (10.20) (87.60) 
0 0 2 1 1 
Portugal 
(0,00) (0,00) (32,76) (15.94) (16.41) 
1 4 6 11 12 
Spain 
(33,72) (17,51) (21,50) (14.54) (53.68) 
0 0 2 2 0 
Sweden 
(0,00) (0,00) (14,54) (17.29) (0,00) 
0 2 0 3 1 
Switzerland 
(0,00) 15,77 (0,00) (66.18) (69.00) 
0 2 3 4 8 
United Kingdom 
(0,00) (50.14) (15,00) (60.60) (83.62) 
Total 8 25 55 78 180 
For each country, the first line indicates the number of banks for which the ownership variables are 
different from zero, and the second line, in brackets, indicates the percentage of stock held by the 
different categories of owners.  
For example, in Belgium, we have 1 bank in which managers/directors hold equity, and these 
managers/directors hold on average 16.48 of the total equity.  
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the ownership variables for the large sample of 905 
banks for which Bankscope Fitch IBCA provide information on the ownership 
structure in 2005 
 
 MANAGER
a FAMILY INSTITUT COMPANY BANK 
 =0 >0 =0 >0 =0 >0 =0 >0 =0 >0 
Number of 
banks 
891 
(98.46) 
14 
(1.54) 
845 
(93.38) 
60 
(6.62) 
724 
(80) 
181 
(20) 
649 
(71.72) 
256 
(28.28) 
289 
(31.94) 
616 
(68.06) 
Percentage 
of equity  
0 0.192 0 2.769 0 9.664 0 18.097 0 62.316 
Five categories of owners are considered: (i) managers/directors (MANAGER); (ii) non-financial 
companies (COMPANY); (iii) individual/family investors (FAMILY); (iv) banks (BANK); and (v) 
institutional investors - insurance company, financial companies and mutual & pension funds - 
(INSTITUT). 
a For example, in the broad sample, we have 891 banks for which managers do not hold equity and 14 
banks for which managers do hold equity. We also present the percentage of banks for which the 
variable MANAGER is not equal to zero (1.54%) as well as the percentage of equity held on average by 
the 14 managers who hold a stake (0.192%) 
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Table A3. Influence of ownership structure and ownership dispersion on the risk-taking behavior of banks, cross-section OLS regressions 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
-0.0284 -6.519 3.489* 38.28 15.27 -2.848 18.12 2.814*** 23.05*** 
CONSTANT 
(-0.04) (-0.54) (1.80) (1.21) (0.33) (-0.47) (0.44) (3.43) (3.14) 
0.674*** 7.696*** 0.0000831 -2.400 -3.674 -0.535* -3.139 0.114* 0.414 
MANAGER 
(15.55) (11.48) (0.00) (-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.97) (-1.44) (1.67) (0.43) 
-0.00179 -0.0565 -0.0162** -0.0223 -0.241 -0.0343 -0.207 -0.00384 -0.0402 
FAMILY  
(-0.52) (-1.47) (-2.05) (-0.04) (-0.51) (-0.86) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-1.03) 
0.00228 -0.0357 -0.0152 0.0743 -0.0171 0.0148 -0.0319 -0.00589 0.0121 
COMPANY 
(0.54) (-0.47) (-1.37) (0.22) (-0.06) (0.47) (-0.13) (-0.82) (0.25) 
-0.00583** -0.0688* -0.00348 0.935 0.593 -0.00322 0.597 -0.00307 -0.0474 
BANK 
(-2.11) (-1.71) (-0.31) (1.60) (1.01) (-0.16) (1.02) (-0.91) (-1.19) 
-0.677*** -7.768*** -0.0271 1.591 3.116 0.460 2.656 -0.0917 -0.133 
 MANAGER*HERF_MANAGER  
(-14.97) (-10.86) (-0.38) (0.76) (1.20) (1.54) (1.13) (-1.30) (-0.14) 
-0.00565 -0.0424 -0.00299 0.895 0.784 0.0610 0.723 0.00681 0.0896 
FAMILY*HERF_FAMILY  
(-0.70) (-0.46) (-0.22) (0.61) (0.81) (0.76) (0.81) (0.53) (0.90) 
-0.00572 0.0819 0.00616 0.128 0.0168 -0.0330 0.0497 0.00444 -0.0163 
COMPANY*HERF_COMPANY  
(-1.10) (0.57) (0.48) (0.34) (0.05) (-0.86) (0.16) (0.54) (-0.23) 
0.00443* 0.0444 -0.00881 -0.726 -0.513 0.000431 -0.514 0.00229 0.0424 
BANK*HERF_BANK  
(1.92) (1.33) (-0.90) (-1.19) (-0.80) (0.02) (-0.81) (0.79) (1.29) 
0.0638* 1.135* -0.110 -3.932** -3.274 0.104 -3.378 -0.0933** -0.359 
M_LNTA 
(1.87) (1.88) (-1.19) (-2.14) (-1.06) (0.35) (-1.16) (-2.14) (-1.09) 
0.0656*** -0.0148 -0.0553** -0.182 -0.833 -0.100 -0.733 0.0454** -0.132 
M_OEQUITY  
(6.64) (-0.15) (-2.07) (-0.43) (-1.38) (-1.63) (-1.30) (2.44) (-1.38) 
-0.00167 0.000154 -0.0130 0.0389 0.00860 -0.0652*** 0.0738 -0.00638** -0.0924*** 
M_DEPOSIT 
(-0.81) (0.00) (-1.44) (0.27) (0.03) (-2.73) (0.30) (-2.04) (-3.14) 
0.229 4.484 -0.367 8.779 32.71 8.985* 23.73 -0.433 0.891 
LISTED 
(0.50) (0.80) (-0.48) (0.43) (1.04) (1.93) (0.87) (-1.03) (0.20) 
0.0505 1.242 -0.120 0.439 6.170 0.0529 6.117 -0.177*** -2.047*** 
LAMBDA 
(1.09) (1.47) (-0.58) (0.14) (1.27) (0.14) (1.32) (-2.73) (-3.06) 
-0.174 -3.660 -0.130 -0.525 -18.29 -5.978* -12.31 0.168 -1.699 
LAMBDA*LISTED 
(-0.48) (-0.76) (-0.35) (-0.04) (-0.81) (-1.78) (-0.62) (0.44) (-0.54) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 244 244 241 242 244 244 244 244 243 
R2 0.313 0.0960 0.108 0.148 0.0644 0.154 0.0623 0.306 0.231 
***, ** and * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10%levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of the return 
on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean  
of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets  
orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero  
otherwise; LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage Probit model.  The variables MANAGER, FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of stock  
held respectively by managers/directors, families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. HERF_J represents the Herfindahl index computed to measure the ownership  
dispersion for the category of shareholder J (see Table 6 for a definition). We also include dummy variables to account for country specific effects.  
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Table A4: Influence of ownership structure on the risk-taking behavior and profitability of large banks (Model 1), cross-section OLS regressions 
  Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
CONSTANT 0.300 3.445 0.181 4.822 -24.90 -2.520 -22.38 3.445*** 43.79*** 
 (0.29) (0.19) (0.07) (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.29) (-0.47) (3.55) (4.29) 
FAMILY -0.00592* -0.125** -0.00219 0.741*** 0.0199 -0.0345 0.0544 -0.00182 -0.0719* 
 (-1.93) (-2.25) (-0.36) (2.76) (0.07) (-0.78) (0.23) (-0.56) (-1.96) 
COMPANY -0.000298 0.0875 0.00434 0.281 -0.288 -0.0383 -0.250 -0.00450 -0.0606 
 (-0.09) (0.73) (0.62) (1.41) (-1.43) (-1.20) (-1.46) (-0.98) (-0.90) 
BANK -0.00196 -0.0387 0.000536 0.538** -0.0881 -0.0283 -0.0598 -0.00235 -0.0693*** 
 (-1.38) (-1.08) (0.18) (2.28) (-0.42) (-0.78) (-0.34) (-1.08) (-2.85) 
M_LNTA 0.0447 0.601 0.0516 -2.953 -0.329 -0.0668 -0.262 -0.114** -1.342*** 
 (0.88) (0.70) (0.44) (-1.35) (-0.11) (-0.16) (-0.11) (-2.37) (-2.68) 
M_OEQUITY 0.0564*** -0.162 -0.0579*** 0.349 0.275 -0.0262 0.302 0.0570*** -0.0766 
 (4.55) (-0.72) (-2.85) (0.63) (0.30) (-0.21) (0.38) (4.43) (-0.47) 
M_DEPOSIT -0.00190 -0.0306 -0.00728 0.0763 -0.143 -0.0625** -0.0808 -0.00662** -0.118*** 
 (-0.57) (-0.47) (-0.49) (0.43) (-0.61) (-2.04) (-0.38) (-2.21) (-3.00) 
LISTED 0.338 3.985 0.807 25.76 58.60 10.37 48.24 -0.796 -7.725 
 (0.59) (0.49) (0.67) (1.20) (1.49) (1.57) (1.46) (-1.54) (-1.37) 
LAMBDA 0.0813 2.532 0.0561 -3.217 1.931 0.0378 1.893 -0.168*** -3.039*** 
 (1.21) (1.62) (0.15) (-1.12) (0.38) (0.05) (0.43) (-2.64) (-3.21) 
LAMBDA*LISTED -0.274 -3.839 -0.447 -0.919 -36.27 -7.058 -29.21 0.306 1.021 
 (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.93) (-0.07) (-1.38) (-1.60) (-1.32) (0.65) (0.25) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 151 151 150 150 151 151 151 151 150 
R2 0.259 0.148 0.103 0.289 0.144 0.205 0.136 0.378 0.233 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. 
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of  the return on average assets; 
SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; 
ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average 
equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = 
mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise; 
LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage Probit model. The variables FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the 
percentage of stock held respectively by families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. We also include dummy variables to account for country 
specific effects.   
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Table A5 Influence of ownership structure on the risk-taking behavior and profitability of small banks (Model 1), cross-section OLS regressions 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
CONSTANT 2.171* 12.99 8.449** -226.3*** -208.4** -16.05** -192.4** 2.126 5.490 
 (1.73) (1.41) (2.27) (-3.13) (-2.62) (-2.19) (-2.58) (1.12) (0.42) 
FAMILY -0.0286** -0.296*** -0.0357 5.077*** 4.520*** 0.344*** 4.176*** 0.0328** 0.252** 
 (-2.61) (-3.18) (-0.97) (6.05) (5.86) (7.15) (5.62) (2.36) (2.09) 
COMPANY -0.00914** -0.0651** -0.0203 0.339 0.309 0.00116 0.308 0.00130 0.0338 
 (-2.31) (-2.37) (-1.58) (1.54) (1.27) (0.08) (1.30) (0.29) (1.00) 
BANK -0.00259 -0.0374 -0.0179 0.0919 0.309 0.0241 0.285 0.000652 0.0306 
 (-0.78) (-1.53) (-1.52) (0.57) (1.58) (1.42) (1.54) (0.17) (0.91) 
M_LNTA 0.00454 0.786 -0.372* -4.794 -5.169 -0.155 -5.014 -0.258* -0.779 
 (0.05) (1.29) (-1.74) (-0.80) (-0.73) (-0.25) (-0.74) (-1.70) (-0.73) 
M_OEQUITY 0.0679*** 0.0612 -0.0723 -0.589 -2.073 -0.150* -1.923 0.0245 -0.190 
 (4.57) (0.98) (-1.33) (-0.66) (-1.57) (-1.70) (-1.49) (0.70) (-1.38) 
M_DEPOSIT -0.00468 -0.0286 -0.0121 0.532 0.753 -0.0633 0.816 -0.00690 -0.119*** 
 (-1.63) (-1.24) (-1.11) (1.23) (1.15) (-1.63) (1.27) (-1.18) (-2.92) 
LISTED -0.479 0.450 -1.844 -32.06 -2.338 2.973 -5.311 -0.249 8.212 
 (-0.87) (0.10) (-1.25) (-0.82) (-0.05) (0.72) (-0.11) (-0.32) (1.10) 
LAMBDA -0.00960 -0.106 -0.232 5.079 12.04 -0.145 12.18 -0.221* -1.758** 
 (-0.13) (-0.21) (-1.10) (1.12) (1.39) (-0.34) (1.43) (-1.95) (-2.06) 
LAMBDA*LISTED 0.924** 9.024* 0.669 -49.80 -36.79 -2.027 -34.76 -0.324 -13.90 
 (2.15) (1.86) (0.59) (-1.14) (-0.80) (-0.52) (-0.79) (-0.34) (-1.52) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 93 93 91 92 93 93 93 93 93 
R2 0.500 0.208 0.193 0.183 0.127 0.177 0.125 0.342 0.267 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. 
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of  the return on average assets; 
SDROE = standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; 
ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average 
equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = 
mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero 
otherwise; LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each bank from the first-stage Probit model. The variables FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent 
the percentage of stock held respectively by families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. We also include dummy variables to account for country 
specific effects.   
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Table A6: Market discipline and influence of ownership structure on risk and profitability, cross-section OLS regressions 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
0.435 4.764 2.128** 57.09*** 90.72** 6.317** 84.41** 1.880*** 15.62*** 
CONSTANT ( 0β ) (0.84) (0.75) (2.50) (2.80) (2.47) (2.42) (2.37) (3.55) (3.52) 
-0.00466 -0.0810** -0.0209* 0.283 0.283 0.0146 0.268 0.000322 -0.000599 
FAMILY ( 1β ) (-1.38) (-2.66) (-1.86) (1.93) (0.83) (-0.80) (0.99) (-0.17) (-0.37) 
-0.00253 -0.0109 -0.0112 0.119 -0.00461 -0.0246 0.0200 -0.000389 -0.0321 
COMPANY ( 2β ) (-0.78) (-0.26) (-1.05) (0.67) (-0.03) (-1.37) (0.12) (-0.10) (-0.67) 
-0.000124 -0.0177 -0.00933 0.161 0.0473 -0.00462 0.0519 -0.000950 -0.0129 
BANK ( 3β ) (-0.05) (-0.64) (-1.07) (1.03) (0.33) (-0.26) (0.41) (-0.37) (-0.49) 
0.0240 -0.388 -0.0120 -3.613* -1.963 -0.315 -1.647 -0.0344 -0.558** 
FAMILY*DISCIPLINE ( 4β ) (0.96) (-0.62) (-0.26) (-1.89) (-0.82) (-1.10) (-0.75) (-0.91) (-2.07) 
-0.00105 0.112 0.00815 0.155 -0.0597 -0.00250 -0.0572 -0.00369 0.0391 
COMPANY*DISCIPLINE ( 5β ) (-0.24) (0.73) (0.62) (0.69) (-0.21) (-0.06) (-0.22) (-0.58) (0.71) 
-0.00296 -0.00628 -0.00204 0.139 0.0663 -0.0390 0.105 -0.00187 -0.0392 
BANK*DISCIPLINE ( 6β ) (-0.91) (-0.15) (-0.22) (0.70) (0.21) (-0.90) (0.38) (-0.46) (-1.07) 
0.0569** 0.857** -0.0658 -5.144*** -6.686** -0.311 -6.374** -0.0591* -0.0817 
M_LNTA ( 8β ) (2.26) (2.16) (-1.11) (-2.77) (-2.14) (-1.45) (-2.10) (-1.66) (-0.29) 
0.0647*** 0.0123 -0.0527** -0.216 -0.892 -0.121* -0.771 0.0482*** -0.141 
M_OEQUITY ( 9β ) (7.14) (0.17) (-1.97) (-0.52) (-1.56) (-1.79) (-1.46) (2.77) (-1.57) 
-0.000872 -0.0280 -0.00514 0.0456 -0.200 -0.0229 -0.177 -0.00384 -0.0133 
M_DEPOSIT ( 10β ) (-0.24) (-0.70) (-0.82) (0.24) (-1.01) (-1.27) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-0.39) 
0.0360 -1.983 -0.339 -4.698 8.936 1.971 6.965 0.395 2.535 
DISCIPLINE ( 7β ) (0.17) (-0.60) (-0.48) (-0.38) (0.38) (0.51) (0.34) (1.06) (0.89) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Risk level to reject 
1 4 0β + β =  0.419 0.460 0.528 0.0859* 0.455 0.253 0.506 0.356 0.0364** 
Risk level to reject 2 5 0β + β =  0.291 0.488 0.745 0.102 0.788 0.467 0.858 0.483 0.874 
Risk level to reject 3 6 0β + β =  0.137 0.438 0.0123** 0.0466** 0.706 0.324 0.554 0.384 0.0763* 
Number of obs. 247 247 244 245 247 247 247 247 246 
R2 0.296 0.0869 0.106 0.124 0.0529 0.116 0.0509 0.305 0.150 
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology.  
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of the return on average assets; SDROE = standard deviation of the return 
on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean  
of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets 
 orthogonalizedwith TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; DISCIPLINE = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank holds more than the median value of  
the ratio of market debt plus uninsured deposits to total assets and zero otherwise;  The variables FAMILY, COMPANY and BANK represent the percentage of stock held respectively by  
families/individuals, non-financial companies and banks. We also include dummy variables to account for country specific effects.  
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Table A7. Influence of the nature of the main shareholder on risk, probability of default, and profitability (Model 1), cross-section OLS 
regressions  
 
 Risk measures Default Risk measures Profitability measures 
 SDROA SDROE M_LLP Z ZP ZP1 ZP2 M_ROA M_ROE 
CONSTANT -0.0482 -8.277 2.869 60.14* 29.07 -2.010 31.08 2.818*** 23.40*** 
 (-0.07) (-0.69) (1.57) (1.94) (0.63) (-0.34) (0.75) (3.66) (3.53) 
FAMILY_OWNED -0.220 -5.555** -1.106** 8.898 1.354 -1.233 2.587 -0.257 -2.039 
 (-1.10) (-2.39) (-2.30) (0.60) (0.10) (-1.12) (0.21) (-0.87) (-0.84) 
COMPANY_OWNED -0.146 4.054 -0.574 2.658 -4.438 -1.519 -2.919 -0.161 -0.564 
 (-0.73) (0.72) (-0.92) (0.19) (-0.36) (-1.18) (-0.25) (-0.61) (-0.19) 
BANK_OWNED -0.0262 -1.045 -0.762* 10.39 4.429 -0.450 4.879 -0.0942 -1.138 
 (-0.16) (-0.53) (-1.72) (0.89) (0.40) (-0.33) (0.49) (-0.54) (-0.63) 
M_LNTA 0.0635* 1.177* -0.120 -4.390** -3.671 0.0831 -3.754 -0.0900** -0.310 
 (1.90) (1.84) (-1.33) (-2.19) (-1.23) (0.30) (-1.33) (-2.08) (-0.96) 
M_OEQUITY 0.0663*** 0.00803 -0.0531** -0.293 -0.926 -0.102* -0.823 0.0459** -0.127 
 (6.84) (0.09) (-1.99) (-0.71) (-1.57) (-1.74) (-1.49) (2.53) (-1.39) 
M_DEPOSIT -0.00222 -0.00505 -0.0113 0.137 0.0754 -0.0671*** 0.142 -0.00701** -0.101*** 
 (-1.04) (-0.13) (-1.30) (0.68) (0.28) (-3.06) (0.56) (-2.32) (-3.78) 
LISTED 0.308 5.368 -0.300 -2.363 25.70 8.642* 17.06 -0.438 0.949 
 (0.69) (0.97) (-0.42) (-0.12) (0.83) (1.93) (0.62) (-1.07) (0.23) 
LAMBDA 0.0447 1.262 -0.124 1.048 6.424 0.00419 6.420 -0.181*** -2.102*** 
 (0.99) (1.42) (-0.62) (0.35) (1.40) (0.01) (1.46) (-2.84) (-3.23) 
LAMBDA*LISTED -0.207 -4.171 -0.159 4.145 -14.89 -5.779* -9.110 0.158 -1.696 
 (-0.59) (-0.89) (-0.46) (0.30) (-0.67) (-1.79) (-0.47) (0.42) (-0.54) 
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 244 244 241 242 244 244 244 244 243 
R2 0.289 0.0744 0.0924 0.104 0.0549 0.153 0.0520 0.301 0.221 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5% and 10%levels respectively. t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. 
Variable definitions (standard deviations and means are computed over the period 1999-2005): SDROA= standard deviation of  the return on average assets; SDROE = 
standard deviation of the return on average equity , M_LLP = mean of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; Z = Z-score; ZP = ZP-score; ZP1=measure of bank 
portfolio risk; ZP2 = measure of leverage risk; M_ROA= mean of the return on average asset; M_ROE= mean of the return on average equity; M_LNTA= mean of the natural 
logarithm of total asset; M_OEQUITY = mean of the ratio of equity to total assets orthogonalized with TA; M_DEPOSIT = mean of the ratio of deposits to total assets; 
LISTED = a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the bank is listed on the stock market and zero otherwise; LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio estimated for each 
bank from the first-stage Probit model. We also include dummy variables to account for country specific effects.  FAMILY-OWNED, COMPANY-OWNED and BANK-
OWNED are dummy variables which take the value of one when ownership is at least equal to 50% of total equity and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Our Model 1 is defined as: 
5
' '
i 0 ji 6 i i
j=1
Y C Zj= α + α +α + ε∑  
with C1i = MANAGERi ; C2i= FAMILYi ; C3i= COMPANYi ; C4i= BANKi;  C5i= INSTITUTi and Zi is a vector 
of control variables. 
As we have 
4
5i ji
j=1
C =100- C∑ ,  we can rewrite Model 1 as following27: 
                                     
4 4
' ' '
i 0 j ji j ji 6 i i
j=1 j=1
4
' ' ' '
0 5 j 5 ji 6 i i
j=1
Y C + (100 C ) + Z
( 100 ) ( )C Z
= α + α α − α + ε
= α + α + α −α +α + ε
∑ ∑
∑  
We can then estimate the following Model: 
                                      
4
i 0 j ji 6 i i
j=1
Y C Z= α + α +α + ε∑  
with  ' ' ' '
0 0 5 j j 5= α +100α and =α -α , j=1,..,4α α . 
 
The estimated coefficient associated with each ownership component Cj has to be interpreted as the effect of a 
substitution between this component and the component C5i. 
 
Regarding Model 2, we have 
                                          
5 5
i 0 j ji j ji i i i
j=1 j=1
RISK C C *LISTED + Z= β + β + γ λ + ε∑ ∑  
We can rewrite Model 2 as following: 
                                                   
4 4 4 4
i 0 j ji 5 ji j ji i 5 ji i i i
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1
4 4
0 5 5 i j 5 ji j 5 ji i i i
j=1 j=1
RISK C + (100 C ) + C *LISTED + (100 C )*LISTED + Z
( 100 100 *LISTED ) ( - )C ( - )C *LISTED + Z
= β + β β − γ γ − λ + ε
= β + β + γ + β β + γ γ λ + ε
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  
 
                                                 
27 For 198 out of the 249 banks, the sum of the percentages of equity held by our five categories of shareholders is equal to 100%. 
